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Introduction
Inflation expectations constitute a vital part of decision making by companies and policymakers alike. In surveys regarding future inflation, respondents are asked to provide their inflation expectations by specifying a point forecast, an interval 1 or an entire distribution of possible outcomes 2 . The question of how to aggregate point forecast or interval data and compute summary statistics touches upon a rich literature examining subjective probability distributions. Specifically, if the survey participants had symmetrically distributed inflation expectations within the bounds they provide, the mean of the interval mid-points would be an accurate statistic for average expected inflation, while the average interval width would be one possible measure for the degree of uncertainty associated with this expected mean. When one departs from the assumption of a symmetric distribution, however, it gets more complicated. As García and Manzanares (2007) show in the context of the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), subjective expectation distributions can exhibit skewness, implying that routinely reported summary statistics do not give a good picture of perceived inflation risks. In particular, they document that during the Volcker era, when inflation was low or negative, the SPF respondents' expectations factored in inflation risks, even while mean expected inflation was low or declining. Asymmetries in inflation expectations are important, they argue, as they might explain the inflation scares observed in the bond market (particularly in 1983-1984) .
In this paper we conduct a simple survey to directly test for asymmetries in inflation expectations provided in interval form. We make use of the transition of Fed leadership from Ben Bernanke to Janet Yellen in the beginning of 2014 to hide the technical aspect of the survey behind a political framing. In a first step, we ask respondents, a sample of non-professional forecasters with an economic background (so that we can be sure they know what inflation is), to provide intervals for their inflation expectations under Ben Bernanke's or Janet Yellen's leadership.
In a second step, we randomize participants into groups which are then asked about the probability they assign to inflation being higher or lower than the midpoints of the intervals they provided. We find that the probabilities provided by the central tendencies of their subjective probability distributions, generally finding that the two measures do not always agree (Engelberg, Manski and Williams (2009), Clements (2010) ).
Our paper provides guidance for the design and analysis of expectation surveys in general and inflation expectation surveys in particular. We contribute to the literature on subjective expectations with our finding that the inflation expectation distributions of our sample of non-professional forecasters with an economic background do not exhibit asymmetry, using a unique experimental set-up. Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the survey, section 3 illustrates the extracted inflation expectations, section 4 analyzes the provided subjective distributions and describes several robustness checks we performed.
The Survey
In this section we detail our survey methodology. We designed the survey to be short in order to get a maximum response rate. Respondents answered 4 questions regarding headline inflation expectations in the U.S. over the next two years. The target audience were non-professional forecasters with an economic background, so that we could be sure that they were familiar with the basic concepts and knew who Ben Bernanke and Janet Yellen are. We sent invitations to complete the An overview of the four questions is given in Table 1 . The first question, "Do you have a background in economics and/or statistics?" (yes/no), was designed to test whether we reached the target audience and used to select only those that actually did have such a background. In question 2, respondents were asked to provide an interval for their expectation regarding headline inflation in the next two years after Janet Yellen begins her appointment as chair of the Federal Reserve. In question 3, respondents were asked to provide an interval under the counterfactual assumption that Ben Bernanke would remain at that post. For question 4 we randomly assigned participants into one of four groups as detailed in Table 1 . We asked participants to report the probability (in %) that average headline inflation would be below (groups 1 and 3) or above (groups 2 and 4) the mid-point of the interval that they provided in questions 2 and 4, if Ben Bernanke had remained chairman (groups 1 and 2) or under Janet Yellen (groups 3 and 4).
The political framing of the questions was intended to prevent participants from answering the survey as if it was a purely technical inquiry. We anticipated that most of the respondents in our sample would be well aware of different methods to estimate inflation, and we intended to put the focus on a real world scenario instead of pure technicalities. Questions 2 and 3 were posed on the same survey page so that respondents directly saw that they needed to provide two intervals, one for Janet Yellen as chair, and one for Ben Bernanke as chair. The intention, beside distracting respondents from technicalities, was to see whether political beliefs cause shifts in the probability distributions. The randomization regarding whether average inflation would be below or above the mid-point of the respondent-provided interval intended to capture asymmetries in the distribution. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for this sample. Regarding the inflation prediction intervals, we see that they look similar both in terms of spread and mid-point irrespective of whether Janet Yellen or Ben Bernanke is in control. A few respondents factor in some probability for deflation (negative inflation) in their lower bounds, while some indicate at least a possibility for very high inflation (8%). The mid-points are close to two percent. The mean indicated probability that average inflation is higher or lower than the mid-point is close to 50 percent. Table 3 , we check whether our randomization strategy worked by comparing answers to questions 2 and 3 among our four groups. Note that randomization only affected question 4, so there should not be a statistically significant difference in answers to previous questions. Group sizes are similar and close to 50. Lower and upper bounds of the inflation intervals, as well as the mid-points, are similar for the four groups. In column 4 of Table 3 , we report P-Values for the Wald test when regressing these outcomes on group indicator variables. The PValues are well above any usually accepted significance level, which suggests that assignment to a group was not related to previous answers. We conclude from these results that our randomization strategy worked. The figure reports surveyed intervals for expected inflation across the respondents and conditional on Janet Yellen (dashed red line) or Ben Bernanke (green solid line) being Fed's chair. The intervals are reordered from the one with the lowest mid-range to the one with the highest mid-range.
Intervals of Expected Inflation
As previously illustrated, every survey respondent could specify an interval for expected inflation conditional on Ben Bernanke or Janet Yellen being the Fed chair. The figure reports estimated densities of lower and upper bound for expected inflation conditional on Janet Yellen (dashed red line) or Ben Bernanke (green solid line) being Fed's chair. The estimate is based on a normal kernel function, using a window parameter (width) that is a function of the given number of points.
Interestingly, if we consider the responses with different intervals for the two scenarios, Janet Yellen was perceived as less, not more dovish than the chairman and we plot the mean probabilities from the SPF against mid-ranges under the scenario that Yellen becomes the Fed chair in Figure 3 . As it can be noticed, the two distributions are almost equivalent. This is interesting for two reasons. First, a simple interval survey question leads to the same aggregate expectation distribution at much less of a cost to the individual respondent. Second, our results on symmetry outlined below touch a subject of great interest in the literature, which has mainly focused on the SPF data. As our survey leads to comparable predictions, we think our results connect well to the existing literature. 
Subjective Distributions
This section illustrates our main result. As already mentioned, we asked the survey respondents in question 4 to provide a probability of expected inflation being higher or lower than a given mid-range. Here, we show that the probability is not statistically different from 0.5, and thus that subjective distribution functions are on average symmetric.
Student's t-test
To test whether the sample mean has a value of 0.5, we run Student's t-test on the overall sample, as well as all possible sub-samples resulting from question 4. We report the results in Table 4 . The probability mass on either side of the implicit mean is not statistically different from 0.5 independently of how we split up the sample. We also test whether the average probability from the sub-sample "Below" is statistically different from the "Above" sub-sample using Welch's t-test of equal means. The test statistic is equal to 0.64 (p-value: 0.53) and thus we are not able to reject the null hypothesis that two means are statistically the same.
Aggregating Subjective Distributions
Roughly 40% of respondents revealed an asymmetric distribution function. In order to assess whether these asymmetries influence the aggregation of inflation expectations, we compare aggregate distributions of mid-ranges 1 2 a + 1 2 b with distributions of implicit means, calculated by using the surveyed probability from question 4 and building a two-point probability mass function for each respondent: x% 100 a + 1 − x% 100 b. Figure 4 illustrates the idea. Incorporating skewness of subjective distributions seem to be irrelevant for the aggregate distribution. In other words, subjective distribution functions appear to be symmetric on average. Note that the distribution of mid-ranges conditional on Janet Yellen being Fed's chair is different than the one we reported in figure   3 . The reason is that figure 4 regards only those respondents who had to answer question 4 conditional on Janet Yellen being Fed's president (i.e. the groups 3 and 4, see table 1).
Robustness Checks
Our sample consists primarily of non-professional forecasters. If only sophisticated forecasters tend to quantify upside/downside risks by revealing asymmetric distributions, our conclusion that asymmetry does not matter could suffer from a selection bias. We address this concern by trying to isolate sophisticated responses in three different ways.
Interval Length
We first check whether respondents, who provided narrower intervals and who are arguably less uncertain about their forecast, tend to reveal asymmetric distribution functions. Table 5 shows that almost half of the respondents provided an interval narrower than 1 percentage point (pp), but the surveyed probability is not statistically different from 0.5. 
Fed Chair
We next look closely at responses that provided different intervals for expected inflation conditional on who would be the Fed's chair. Table 6 shows that the split 6 If we split the sub-sample "1.0 -2.0" into those who got question 4 with either "Bernanke"
(groups 1 & 2) or "Yellen" (groups 3 & 4) in it, the average probability is statistically lower than 0.5 for the letter scenario. Nonetheless, the sub-sample is relatively small with only 26 responses.
Results available upon request.
does not seem to matter. 
CPI or PCE (?!)
As provided a mid-interval between 2.1 and 2.5 %, 13 out of 32 (41%) gave 0.5 as the probability and the subjective distributions are on average statistically equal to 0.5 (with t-stat of 0.85).
Conclusion
In this paper we presented evidence from a simple survey that tests for asymmetries in inflation expectation distributions. The survey was conducted among a sample of non-professional forecasters with an economic background. We asked respondents to provide their inflation expectations under two different Fed chairs, Ben Bernanke if he would not have stepped down, and Janet Yellen. Our results do not reveal any patterns of asymmetry in their expectations, implying that the interval mid-points give an accurate representation of average expected inflation, and interval length would be one possible summary statistic for the degree of uncertainty.
These results are in line with several previous studies who analyzed the Survey of Professional Forecasters or similar data sets and found no significant departures from symmetry. However, we caution that our results reflect expectations at a particular point in time, and that it may well be that our findings depend on the general business cycle situation. We address concerns about different degrees in forecasters' sophistication and find no evidence that this aspect matters for symmetry. From a political stand-point, it seems interesting to note that our sampleeconomists from reputable academic and policy institutions-expect lower inflation under Janet Yellen's leadership compared to the hypothetical scenario of Ben Bernanke remaining chair of the Fed.
